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According to historical facts, military elites were never totally separated from intellectual civil elites. From 
Ancient times to nowadays professional military education and personal contacts flourished due to mutual 
interest between these two parties. It is not easy task to define if this interaction was constructive or not for 
military since there is rich contradictory evidence – how stoics educated victorious Roman imperial army and 
how Henri Bergson’s name is associated with two military blunders of France in the both world wars, despite 
of heavy criticism from his civil colleagues and generals in interwar period. Thus, it is important to understand, 
which intellectual biases and fashion are represented in contemporary Western military periodics and academic 
scholarship as a mirror of contemporary military thinking. The overall trend can be defined as “postmodernist 
turn”, which is realized in the following three main forms: shallow, adherent and critical. The majority of 
military writers, being familiar with the leading civil intellectuals through their higher education in humanities 
and social science, apply for postmodernist agenda pursuing the general intellectual mainstream fashion, which 
is common for both civil and military publications. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases this happens due to 
shallow following mainstream narrative, not because of the personal priorities, when adherence to a specific 
intellectual fashion is well-grounded and clearly motivated. The same is applicable to the military criticism of 
postmodernism, when the critical approach refers to the deep competence in contemporary intellectual debates 
among civil experts. This approach mainly reproduces devastating criticism of postmodernism as relativist, 
a way of thinking which is not relevant to military profession. This situation can be quite fruitful both for 
military and civil academics: it creates perfect conditions for critical debates aimed for clearing out fashionable 
metaphors, popular mindsets and elements of narrative, where pure theoretic structures can face the trial of 
practitioners, whose professional decisions are extremely responsible for safety of human lives and national 
security. Anyway, the internal opposition to the supporters of postmodernism in military sciences gives hope that 
it has all the chances not to become an overwhelming trend in military scholarship.
Воєнна професія та освіта і наука ніколи не були повністю відокремлені одна від одної. Починаючи 
з епохи Античності, офіцери завжди контактували з цивільними інтелектуалами – особисто чи на інсти-
туційному рівні.
Поширення гуманітарної освіти серед офіцерів збройних сил країн Заходу визначається дослідника-
ми як позитивний чинник, який поліпшує здатності військових до критичного мислення при виконанні 
службових обов’язків, розширює їхній світогляд. 
Однак досі залишається невивченим питання, як саме зміст сучасної вищої гуманітарної освіти 
може впливати на бойові здатності офіцерів. Сучасна Західна освіта та інтелектуальна мода значно 
відрізняються від, наприклад, наукової основи діяльності стратегічних служб, закладених Шерма-
ном Кентом – дедалі частіше у фаховій літературі можна зустріти посилання на такі поняття, як 
«релятивізм», «ризома», «соціальний конструкт» та інших, що можна віднести до лексикону «пост-
модернізму».
Лише в деяких випадках автори спеціалізованих воєнних видань демонструють достатню обізнаність 
в особливостях сучасних наукових та культурних напрямків, що дозволяє їм критично оцінювати інте-
лектуальну моду, яка поширюється і на воєнних науковців. 
В статті були виокремлені такі способи рецепції постмодерністської тематики: поверхнева, схвальна 
та критична. 
Дописувачі професійної воєнної періодики мають, як правило, і вищу гуманітарну цивільну, і фахову 
воєнну освіту. Не дивлячись на це, досить часто трапляються випадки некритичного чи необґрунтовано-
го використання елементів постмодерністського наративу, що можна пояснити загальними тенденціями 
у воєнній публіцистиці та персональними уподобаннями дослідників. Щоправда, також наявна і критика 
постмодерністського «ухилу» у воєнній публіцистиці, де використовуються матеріали академічних де-
батів, в яких беруть участь цивільні фахівці.
«Постмодерністський поворот» американських воєнних науковців: 
поверхневий, схвальний чи критичний?
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Наразі можна стверджувати, що постмодерністські уподобання сучасних воєнних науковців та пу-
бліцистів – це здебільшого данина тенденціям інтелектуальної моди, а спротив цим тенденціям, який ві-
дображений у воєнній періодиці та фаховій літературі, вказує на вірогідність того, що ця інтелектуальна 
мода може не стати визначальною в царині воєнних дисциплін.
Лобода Ю. А., Лондонский королевский колледж
«Постмодернистский поворот» американских военных ученых: 
поверхностный, одобрительный или критический?
Военная профессия, образование и наука никогда не были полностью отделены друг от друга. Начи-
ная с эпохи Античности, офицеры всегда контактировали с гражданскими интеллектуалами – лично или 
на институциональном уровне.
Распространение гуманитарного образования среди офицеров вооруженных сил стран Запада опре-
деляется исследователями как положительный фактор, который улучшает способности военных к крити-
ческому мышлению при выполнении служебных обязанностей, расширяет их мировоззрение.
Однако до сих пор остается неисследованным вопрос о том, как именно содержание современного 
высшего гуманитарного образования может влиять на боевые способности офицеров. Современное За-
падное образование и интеллектуальная мода значительно отличаются от, например, научной основы 
деятельности стратегических служб, заложенных Шерманом Кентом – все чаще в профессиональной 
литературе можно встретить ссылки на такие понятия как «релятивизм», «ризома», «социальный кон-
структ» и других, которые можно отнести к лексикону «постмодернизма».
Только в некоторых случаях авторы специализированных военных изданий демонстрируют доста-
точную осведомленность в особенностях современных научных и культурных направлений, что позво-
ляет им критически оценивать интеллектуальную моду, которая распространяется и на военных ученых.
В статье были выделены такие способы рецепции постмодернистской тематики: поверхностная, одо-
брительная и критическая. 
Корреспонденты профессиональной военной периодики имеют, как правило, и высшее гуманитарное 
гражданское, и профессиональное военное образование. Несмотря на это, довольно часто встречаются 
случаи некритического или необоснованного использования элементов постмодернистского нарратива, 
что можно объяснить общими тенденциями в военной публицистике и персональными симпатиями ис-
следователей. 
Тем не менее, также присутствует и критика постмодернистского «уклона» в военной публицистике, 
где используются материалы академических дебатов, в которых участвуют гражданские специалисты.
На сегодняшний день можно утверждать, что постмодернистские симпатии современных военных 
ученых и публицистов – это преимущественно дань тенденциям интеллектуальной моды, а сопротивле-
ние этим тенденциям, которое отражено в военной периодике и профессиональной литературе, указыва-
ет на вероятность того, что эта интеллектуальная мода может не стать определяющей в сфере военных 
дисциплин.
 Ключевые слова: философия; гуманитарные дисциплины; интеллектуальная мода; военные дисциплины; 
культура постмодерна; деконструктивизм; социальный конструктивизм
This very fashionable quotation (which is sometimes erroneously ascribed to Thucydides) roams from one article 
written by military scholar to another: ‘The 
nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line 
of demarcation between the fighting man and the 
thinking man is liable to find its fighting done 
by fools and its thinking by cowards’ [4, p. 85]. 
Actually, in European history the division between 
civil academics and military professionals happened 
not so often. Ancient philosophers educated Greek 
and Roman generals (emperors Marcus Aurelius 
and Julian were philosophers); in I-II AD stoic 
philosophy dominated in Roman society and its 
army as well; Prince Eugene of Savoy treated 
Leibnitz’ “Monadology” as a sacred writing [27, 
p. 202]; pre-Great War French generals obtained 
a name of “bergsonians”, in the Soviet Military 
universities the Marxist-Leninist philosophy was 
compulsory course. Modern military specialists 
cannot avoid completely familiarization with 
contemporary intellectual culture, especially when 
it turns to a fashion. They read books and papers, 
they have their personal scientific interests, they 
receive professional education which to some extent 
reflects contemporary intellectual debates.
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It is very complicated question in which way 
this influence, especially represented by leading 
public intellectuals, really works and what it brings 
to military practitioners. One of the first modern 
researchers of this issue was Julien Benda, who 
raised a question about real value of contribution of 
public intellectuals and its doubtful character [1]; 
the failures of the French Plan XVII were attributed 
to H.Bergson: “Before 1914 France possessed a 
General Staff worthy to be called Bergsonian. Its 
doctrine accepted the discredit of intelligence and 
favoured the cult of intuition. This is a statement 
which is stupefying and incredible: at first sight it 
is positively staggering. But after due examination 
it emerges as a perfectly truthful assertion. And this 
General Staff of ours forced its conviction to the 
ultimate limits” [24, p. 33]. Contemporary criticism 
is aimed to intellectuals who create “intellectual 
markets” [26]. Besides the public intellectuals, the 
form of penetration of civil scholarship to military 
agenda could be considered as institutionalized: for 
example, numerous US departments of philosophy 
advertise themselves stating that their graduates 
are welcomed in CIA; students who received their 
degrees via ROTC (up to 38% newly commissioned 
army officers, 16% - Navy, 38% - Air Force) 
program deliver their intellectual abilities to armed 
forces. From one side, the professional contribution 
of officers, trained in humanities and liberal arts 
are assessed as positive [11; 3, p. 127; 7]; from the 
other side researchers note that education system 
in the USA could be characterized as politically 
and ideologically biased [10], which can have 
unpredictable outcomes in the context of active 
service in the US armed forces; there is no evidence 
that any serious study was done in this realm.
If to compare influence of two different 
intellectual mainstreams – analytical and post-
modern – the last is overwhelming. It dominates 
higher educational agenda, because it does not 
require fundamental special preparation, and it 
covers general cultural issues. Analytical school of 
thought is too specific to be popular within society.
The intellectual fashion of Post-Modernism 
thought is represented in publications of the US 
military scholars. Traditional academic approach, 
founded by Sherman Kent [13], Washington Platt 
[25] etc appeared too conservative for modern 
challenges [28, p. 407-412], which forced search 
for new intellectual guidelines and methods, where 
Post-Modernism with its human/social orientation 
and variety of interpretations has looked at optimal 
solution. Open-source papers printed by military 
scholars do not reflect the attack on the Post-
Modernism by A.Sokal and J.Bricmont [29; 30] 
and other critical reviews, but it does not make the 
fashion for Post-Modernism more shallow.
Nevertheless, the term “post-modern” is often 
used not to refer to specific intellectual culture, but 
just to indicate the contemporary time:
In fact, maybe the conflict in Afghanistan should 
be labelled “The Post-Modern War Experiment.” 
[19, p. 34].
It is too soon to determine whether this 
development, involving loose networks of 
combatants who come together for a discrete 
purpose only to quickly disperse upon its 
achievement, will prove to be a lasting or completely 
ephemeral characteristic of postmodern insurgency. 
Hoffman B. [12, p. 14].
Using this perceptual lens, we can think of 
warfare as transitioning from the modern to the post-
modern era — just as the political and economic 
systems are doing [3, p. 12].
Necessarily, the lethal operations that are 
conducted in the physical domain must be, to some 
degree, supported and reinforced by nonlethal 
execution in the Human Domain in order to achieve 
the same success in the Cyber Domain model of the 
current post-modern terrorist [6, p. 6].
The point Clausewitz is at pains to make is that 
where one combat arm is strong another is weak. 
Hence, they are interdependent.  We like to believe 
this notion of interdependence is a post-modern 
phenomenon, but it was apparent in the 19th century 
and over 2,000 years before to the Romans and 
Macedonians. [2, p. 77-78].
There is a radical difference between strategy 
formulated to fight conventional wars and deter 
nuclear wars and that necessary to conduct armed 
struggle in the post-modern world [14, p. 12]; 
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not 
lend themselves to maneuver warfare, air-centric 
warfare, or effects-based operations, although each 
is relevant to the task of developing a theory of post-
modern conflict [14, p. 21].
More deep understanding of what actually 
Post-Modernism is shows Colonel Christopher 
R. Paparone, U.S. Army, retired, an associate 
professor in the Army Command and General Staff 
College’s Department of Logistics and Resource 
Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia: “The primary role 
of the postmodern professional organization is no 
longer to be a producer of knowledge, stability, and 
certainty; rather, it is to be a constant organizer in a 
never-ending condition of complexity - spawning a 
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spontaneous approach to replacing tools that are not 
working” [20, p. 45]; “This sensemaking through 
high quality human network connections can 
facilitate improvisation among the members of the 
logistics community (perhaps this is the principal 
task of the postmodern logistician)” [21, p. 42]. 
He proposes his own project of “deconstruction” 
of metaphors which are used in military language: 
“This essay has proposed a framework that can assist 
in needed reflection and help professionals decipher 
whether specific metaphors are imaginative enough. 
The mindless tyranny of defunct metaphors in 
Western military knowledge has already proven its 
liabilities. Mindfulness of the inherent potential for 
such domination can serve to motivate imaginative 
ways to explore breakthrough sensemakings. Such 
reflection could lead to inventions of breathtakingly 
rich eloquence in postmodern military discourse” 
[22, p. 55].
Col. Dale Eikmeier writes about opposition 
of the post-modern thought to classical mindsets: 
“They suggest that an enlightenment-age concept 
based on Newtonian physics, reductive logic, and 
determinism is too simple to contribute to the 
understanding of complex adaptive systems in a 
postmodern age.” [9, p. 5]; post-modern thought 
is clearly attributed to social research: “To bring 
some context to this abstract proposal, I introduce 
in this article several design concepts  that draw 
from post-modern philosophical and sociological 
fields that help us consider whether our  Army may 
inadvertently train to fail, and how it as effectively 
insulated itself from even questioning these 
institutionalisms” [32, p. 16].
Military scholars go further when they quote the 
most significant post-modern writers – M.Foucault, 
J.Derrida, J.Baudrillard etc, technical terms like 
“rhizome”, “deconstruction”, “hermeneutics”, 
Simulacrum etc.
The term “rhizome” is used to refer to a non-
conventional system of command “The rhizomatic 
command system is difficult to attack, just as 
rhizomatic weeds are difficult to eradicate. General 
Smith cautions that rhizomes are eradicated by one 
of three methods: 1) digging them up; 2) poisoning 
or removing the nutrients from the soil; or 3) 
penetrating the roots with a systemic poison. Cutting 
off the visible heads of rhizomes causes them to 
lie dormant for a time — at best. The attack on a 
rhizomatic command system is done best from all 
three directions—operations in each direction being 
conducted to complement the others. This takes us to 
the need to conduct a “holistic” war with a total unity 
of effort” [15, p. 29-30]; Organization to Deal with 
a “Rhizomatic” Command System and to Generate 
a Total Unity of Effort. A rhizomatic command 
system operates with an apparently hierarchical 
system above ground—visible in the operational and 
political arenas and with another system centered in 
the roots underground. It is a horizontal system with 
many discrete groups. The system develops to suit 
its surroundings and purpose in a process of natural 
selection, and with no predetermined operational 
structure. Its foundation is that of the social structure 
of its locale. The groups vary in size, but those that 
survive and prosper are usually small and organized 
in cells whose members will not necessarily know 
their relationship with, or the membership of, 
other cells. A cell will perform a minimum of three 
tasks: 1) direct and sometimes lead military action; 
2) collect and hold resources such as money and 
weapons; and, 3) direct and sometimes conduct 
political actions, which can range from bombing 
train stations, to funding schools, to electioneering. 
Cells will normally be allowed considerable 
latitude in the methods they adopt to suit the local 
circumstances—provided the cell is both successful 
and no more corrupt than what is condoned by the 
general movement. In all cases, the need for security 
is paramount [16, p. 18-19]. 
Maj. Ben E. Zweibelson, a squadron executive 
officer for 1/2 Cavalry Regiment, USAREUR, a 
graduate, of the U.S. Army School of Advanced 
Military Studies, believes that J.Bodrillard and 
critical assessment of his concept of simulacre 
can help to improve US Army training process: 
“Design” as it relates to military applications has a 
broad range of conceptual, holistic applications for 
dealing with complexity, although most services 
attempt to brand their own design approach for self-
relevant concerns. Army design methodology does 
not include any of these concepts in U.S. Army 
doctrine nor does our training strategy specifically 
reference design theory. However, critical reflection 
and holistic, systemic approaches might illustrate 
our training shortfalls. To conduct this inquiry, we 
draw from philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s concept 
of simulation and simulacra. We also reference 
sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s 
collaborative concept of “social knowledge 
construction,” to demonstrate how the Army 
potentially trains in an approach that is in conflict 
with what we expect our training to accomplish. 
Are we spending our energies, resources, and time 
in training approaches that are detrimental to our 
overarching goals because they train us in the wrong 
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ways? To return to the plot of the science fiction 
movie quoted at the beginning, shall we swallow the 
red pill and face uncomfortable truths, or swallow 
the blue pill and continue enjoying the false realities 
we create for ourselves through training the force 
toward national policy goals? [32, p. 16]. 
LTC Leesa J. Papier, US Army, uses Baudrillard’s 
concept “simulacre” to answer the question how to 
build a proper strategy against enemy’s propaganda: 
“The democratic system must remove the ambiguity 
and establish the position of power in that discourse. 
The difficulty of addressing the simulation through 
discourse is that it regenerates and regenerates its 
own logic. According to Baudrillard, contradicting 
one set of signs by producing another set of signs 
causes the system to disintegrate as it moves further 
from reality. The USG must establish the reality 
of the democratic system and remain consistent 
through truth in its representation of that system. 
As long as the United States responds reactively 
with ill-thought ‘huh-uh’ statements to propaganda 
designed to denigrate and destroy the democratic 
system, it is doomed to fail in the long war. The 
democratic logic is threatened by a simulation, the 
threat of vanishing in a play of words, risking the 
real power of the system.” [23, p. 55]. 
J. Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, as MAJ 
Sean C. Chang, US Army, argues, can be used in 
military operations: “Lastly, the Israeli military 
employed poststructuralism and the concept of 
deconstruction in 2002. In an attempt to rearrange 
space in an urban environment, Israeli military 
commanders tried to conduct military operations 
from a deconstructionist perspective, questioning 
“the relationship between conflict and space.” More 
specifically, this was an attempt to apply Derrida’s 
deconstruction concept by seeing and understanding 
the relationship of urban battlefield from a 
different lens. For example, an Israeli commander 
commented that “defining inside as outside and 
interiors of homes as thoroughfare [with] soldiers 
used none of streets, roads, alleys and courtyards 
that make up the order of the city.” In Operation 
Defensive Shield, the Israeli military demonstrated 
that poststructuralism and deconstruction are more 
than just some ivory tower intellectual ideas. These 
concepts have tangible applicability in real world 
security and military operations because they offer a 
credible alternative perspective” [5].
Fashion for post-modernism can seem attractive 
for researchers who try to find new language for 
explanation of new realities. Postmodernist thinkers 
also offer new ways of thinking, which encourage 
variety of interpretations, focusing on complexities 
of human-society interaction, and a structure of 
society in general. The critics of Post-Modernist 
thought insist that it is irrational and relativist, and 
military writers partially participate in this counter-
paradigm.
Being aware of the “Sokal-Brickmont 
affair” or not, military professional blame post-
modernists in fake intellectualism, which hides 
behind the sophisticated rhetoric: “The IDF’s 
transient embrace of SOD post-modern theories 
at the expense of traditional principles of war 
was, arguably, one of the strangest episodes in the 
history of military doctrine. Using John Ellis’ work 
Against Deconstruction as a backdrop to describe 
the failings of SOD, Yehuda Wegman writes that 
SOD was “the image of intelligence and complexity 
. . . the use of rhetorical means in order to create the 
illusion of intelligent analysis at a time when there 
was no such analysis.” Wegman adds, “The first 
casualty of the new language was the main principle 
of war: adhering to the mission” [18, p. 41]. It is 
assumed that principles of classic rational thinking 
are still needed in the modern world: “Amazingly, 
there were even more officers uncomfortable with 
questioning their fundamental assumptions about 
warfare. Today I realize that SAMS could only do 
so much in introducing different ways to approach 
the subject. Even after looking into postmodern 
philosophies, alternative construction of social 
meaning, and complexity theory and systems 
thinking, the SAMS curricula could not break away 
from the demands of the Army in forcing upon us the 
technically rational paradigm. Thus, after studying 
how complex adaptive systems resist reductionist 
understanding and deliberate, rational approaches 
— we launched into the military decision-making 
process (MDMP), center of gravity analysis, and 
backwards, intuitive planning” [17, p. 43]. But the 
heaviest criticism goes from military academics 
with highly professional background in humanities, 
i.e. history: “Although dissimilar in many regards, 
the post-structuralist theories of Michel Foucault, 
the deconstructionist notions of Jacques Derrida, 
and Dominick La Capra’s techniques of literary 
criticism all have one thing in common - they attack 
some very basic assumptions about what we know 
and how certain we are about knowing it. To be sure, 
these theorists often wrap themselves in impenetrable 
jargon and make some seemingly absurd claims 
about all knowledge being reducible to a text. 
Yet, one of postmodernism’s central arguments 
- that the past “as it actually was” is essentially 
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irrecoverable and, therefore, unknowable - rings as 
true as Michael Howard’s observation that history 
is merely what historians write. The postmodernists 
go one step further, maintaining that historical 
writing itself, because it involves the personal 
interpretation of the historian and is therefore 
an inevitably imperfect rendering of the past, is 
closer to fiction than nonfiction. Indeed, they have 
a point ... Indeed, in one sense, the post-structuralists, 
deconstructionists, and literary critics seem to have 
hoisted themselves on their own petards. One of the 
central premises of their argument that the meaning of 
texts emerges independent of authorial intent gives rise 
to a philosophical contradiction. After all, if a text can be 
interpreted in any way the reader desires without regard 
to authorial intent, then what would prevent historians 
from reading the texts of the postmodernists in any way 
that we choose, even in ways that reinforce the validity 
of historical writing?” [8].
Thus, it is possible to assert that military 
theorists to some extent reflect the situation in 
civil intellectual culture: there is a textual evidence 
of the opposition between Post-Modernists and 
their more conservative critics. In general, not so 
many published texts of military scholars deal 
with so called “cognitive realm”, where the likes 
and dislikes of Post-Modernism can appear, but 
in some polemic papers it is seen that the debate 
between Post-Modernists and “conservatives” is 
much intensive than between their civil colleagues 
on the “intellectual market”. There could be various 
reasons for that – no fear of a threat to career for 
established scholars, or just more practical character 
of the military profession, which requires higher 
level of responsibility of words and thoughts than, 
say, a profession of lecturer of literature critic. 
Anyway, the “Post-Modernist turn” is a response 
to the challenge of understanding of new realities 
of war that essentially changed since the end of the 
Cold War. And its criticism and debates within the 
military community may contribute not only the 
development of military theory, but the advance of 
humanities as well. Since the concepts and mindsets 
of the leading Post-Modernist thinkers are applied in 
military theory and practice, this experience should 
be studied by the specialists in humanities in the 
first instance – whether this application was done 
correctly, if not – what interfered and why; which 
results were received, how adequately the Post-
Modernist agenda was apprehended and, of course, 
how acceptable the criticism of Post-Modernist 
thinking in military science was. This analysis 
can contribute not only military theory, it can be 
inspirational for the civil thinkers as well.
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